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Herero genocide in the twentieth Century:
Politics and memory
Jan-Bart Gewald
Between 1904 and 1908 imperial Germany pitrsued an
active policy of genocide in German South West Africa,
present-day Namibia. This chapter analyses the manner in
which, during the course of the twentieth Century, numerous
people in varying contexts have sought to use the genocide
perpetrated upon the Herero to further their own ends. It
charts the manner in which an historical event has come to
be deployed for varying and, at times, contradictory
interests by German social democrats and English
imperialists through to anti-Apartheid activists and post-
colonial tribalists. It has been used to strengthen arguments
that range from colonial policies through to claims that cal l
for ethnic autonomy and compensation.
Introduction
On 11 January 1904, the Herero-German War broke out in a small dusty town
in central German South West Africa (GSWA), present-day Namibia. By the
time hostilities ended in 1908, genocide had been committed, the majority of
the Herero people had been killed, and the survivors, mostly women and
children, incarcerated in concentration camps as forced labourers.' Throughout
the twentieth Century, Herero survivors and descendants used the memory of
this seminal act of failed resistance to substantiate and justify further acts of
resistance against the colonial and post-colonial state in Namibia.
' J.B. Gewald, 'Forced Labour in the Onjembo, the Herero German War of 1904-1908',
Itinerario, XIX, l (1995) and J.B. Gewald, Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of
the Herero of Namibia 1890-1923 (Oxford, 1999), 141-91.
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In this chapter, after a short description of the Herero genocide, a chronological
overview is provided of the manner in which Herero and others have used the
memories and historical recollections of the Herero-German War as a political
instrument to support and further their own ends. The conscious deployment or
negation of memories and references to the genocide has been used to
strengthen arguments in support of a variety of issues ranging from colonial
policies and claims through to ethnic autonomy and compensation. This is
followed by a short discussion on the manner in which historical memories may
be used to further political objectives. In conclusion it is noted that memories of
resistance are powerful incentives for further resistance, and that a continued
dialectical relationship between memory and resistance existed among the
Herero of Namibia throughout the twentieth Century."
The Herero-German War (1904-1908)
Misunderstandings and the paranoia of self-fulfilling settler prophecies led to a
war of extreme brutality and conscious genocide perpetrated by German troops
against the Herero and to a lesser extent Nama peoples of colonial South West
Africa.3 The increasing socio-economic pressure placed upon Herero society by
the arrival of ever more German settlers demanding land and assuming racial
privilege produced a tense Situation. The war did not result from premeditated
insurrection against German rule, rather, amid the tension that had developed
over time, a single shooting incident served as a trigger. Starting in Okahandja,
the war spread across central Namibia and developed in intensity and brutality
as fresh contingents of German troops disembarked and attempted to impose
their vision of order on the territory and its inhabitants. The Kaiser's personal
choice and appointment of commanding officers in GSWA signalled the highest
authorization and endorsement of what occurred in the name of imperial
Germany. In a policy of genocide, German soldiers and settlers sought out, shot,
beat, hung, starved and raped Herero men, women and children. By the end of
2
 For those interested in looking at a similar approach to history, i.e. the manner in
which memories of violence influence and determine later action, see J. Alexander, J.
McGregor & T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark
Forests' of Matabeleland (Oxford, 2000) and L.H. Malkki, Purtty and Exile: Violence,
Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago, 1995).
3
 Those seeking a detailed day-to-day introduction to the Herero-German War are
referred to G. Pool, Die Herero-Opstand 1904-1907 (Cape Town, 1979). For an
English introduction see J.M. Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros (Berkeley, 1981).
Regarding the concept of self-fulfilling settler prophecies, see S. Marks, Reluctant
Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal (Oxford, 1970).
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1904 the war had spread to southern Namibia. Here it also overwhelmed the
Nama inhabitants of GSWA. When it finally ended, no fewer than 80% of the
Herero and at least 50% of the Nama had lost their lives.4 Most of the Herero
who remained, primarily women and children, survived in concentration camps
as forced labourers employed on state, military and civilian projects.5 In short,
the war and its aftermath were characterized by acts of excessive violence and
cruelty on the part of German soldiers and settlers.
Indiscriminate shootings, hangings and beatings were the order of the day.
The diaries, letters and photographs of contemporaries are littered with
references to these events. Missionary Elger, working in the settlement of
Karibib along the railway line to Windhoek, reported in his diary that all hè
heard was 'aufräumen aufhängen niederknallen bis auf den letzten Mann, Kein
Pardon' (clean-up hang-up shoot-down till the last man, no pardon). Elger also
described the manner in which Herero prisoners were treated:
Things proceeded in a particularly brutal manner. Herero prisoners were terribly
maltreated, whether they were guilty or not guilty. About 4 Herero were taken
prisoner, because they were supposed to have killed a railway worker (Lehmann,
Habis). The courtmartial ordered them to be freed and declared them to be not
guilty. Ho wever one could not release them äs they bore too many marks of
shamerul abuse [Schändlicher Mißhandlung] on their bodies. For example, people
had beaten an eye out of one. After the court martial had declared them to be
innocent, some of the Germans outside immediately resumed the abuse with the
words, 'the court has declared you to be innocent, we however want to string you
up'.6
After the initial battles, the civilian governor was relieved of his command
and replaced by the Kaiser's own candidate, Lieutenant-General Lothar von
Trotha.7 Under the command of Von Trotha, the German army sought to
engineer a crushing defeat of the Herero in the vicinity of the Waterberg.8 In
keeping with Von Moltke's principles of separate deployment and encirclement,
4
 The history of the Nama-German War and its ongoing aftermath äs well as the impact
on Nama society are not dealt with in this chapter. Interested readers are advised to read
H. Drechsler, 'Let us Die Fighting': The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against
German Imperialism (1884-1915) (London, 1980), first published in German (Berlin,
1966).
5
 Gewald, Herero Heroes, 141-230.
6
 Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN), VI2 Karibib,
JBG's translation.
7
 See H. Bley, South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914 (London, 1971), 158-
63 for a discussion on the appointment of Von Trotha.
s
 Pool, Opstand, 210-11.
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Von Trotha sent out his armies to annihilate the Herero at the Waterberg. Or, as
hè put it in his own words:
My initial plan for the Operation, which I always adhered to, was to encircle the
masses of Hereros at Waterberg, and to annihilate these masses with a simultaneous
blow, then to establish various stations to hunt down and disarm the splinter groups
who escaped, later to lay hands on the captains by putting prize money on their
heads and finally to sentence them to death.9
On 11 August the Battle of Hamakari took place at the Waterberg. The
Herero were defeated and fled in a southeasterly direction into the dry desert
sands of the Kalahari, known to the Herero as the Omaheke.]0 Von Trotha
issued orders which, by placing a cordon along the waterholes, cut off all escape
routes to the west, south and northeast. This effectively forced the fleeing
Herero to move ever further into the inhospitable Omaheke.11 Surrounded by the
desert and German patrols, the Herero chiefs and their followers congregated
along the Eiseb River.
Around l October 1904, General Lothar von Trotha, who was actively
taking part in the pursuit, and his retinue had reached the Osombo-Windimbe
waterhole. During the afternoon of the following day, Sunday 2 October 1904,
after the holding of a field service, General von Trotha addressed his officers.12
In his address hè declared that the war against the Herero would be continued in
all earnestness and read out a proclamation, which stated amongst others that:
The Herero people must.. .leave the land. If the populace does not do this I will force
them with the Groot Rohr [Cannon]. Within the German borders every Herero, with
or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will no longer accept women
and children, I will drive them back to their people or I will let them be shot at.
These are my words to the Herero people.
The great General of the mighty German Kaiser.13
Of late a number of authors have sought to deny or at least downplay the
existence and implications of Von Trotha's proclamation, which has become
9
 Von Trotha's diaries cited in G. Pool, Samuel Maharero (Windhoek, 1992), 251.
10
 Pool, Opstand, 219-40. Omaheke is the Otjiherero name for the sandveld area east of
the Waterberg.
11
 Pool, Opstand, 245 ff.
12
 C. Rust, Krieg und Frieden in Hererolande: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kriegsjahre
1904 (Berlin, 1905), 384.
13Namibian National Archives Windhoek (NNAW), ZBU D.La Band 3-4, leaf 165.
With thanks to Mr W. Hillebrecht for finding it at such short notice. JBG's translation.
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known as the Vernichtungsbefehl™ However, Von Trotha's own words, in his
diary and elsewhere, indicate that hè knew füll well what his proclamation
would entail. On the day the proclamation was issued, Von Trotha wrote in a
letter:
I believe that the nation as such should be annihilated, or, if this was not possible by
tactical measures, have to be expelled from the country by operative means and
further detailed treatment. This will be possible if the water-holes from Grootfontein
to Gobabis are occupied. The constant movement of our troops will enable us to find
the small groups of the nation who have tnoved back westwards and destroy them
gradually.
My intimate knowledge of many central African tribes (Bantu and others) has
everywhere convinced me of the necessity that the Negro does not respect treaties
but only brute force.15
From 1904 and through into 1905 Ludwig von Estorff, one of Von Trotha's
officers, 'had the thankless task of chasing atter the refugees in the Sandveld
and preventing their return'.16 Estorff s own words describe clearly what hè did
and what his commanding officer's intentions were:
I followed their tracks and found numerous wells which presented a terrifying sight.
Cattle which had died of thirst lay scattered around the wells. These cattle had
reached the wells but there had not been enough time to water them. The Herero fled
ahead of us into the Sandveld. Again and again this terrible scène kept repeating
itself. With feverish energy the men had worked at opening up the wells, however
the water became ever sparser, and wells evermore rare. They fled from one well to
the next and lost virtually all their cattle and a large number of their people. The
people shrunk into small groups who continually feil into our hands [unsere Gewalt
kamen}, some of the people escaped now and again through the Sandveld into
English territory [present-day Botswana]. It was a policy which was equally
gruesome as senseless, to hammer the people so much, we could have still saved
many of them and their rieh herds, if we had pardoned and taken them up again, they
14
 B. Lau, 'Uncertain Certainties: The Herero-German War of 1904', in Mibagus, 2
(April 1989) 4-8; K. Poewe, The Namibian Herero: A History of their Psychosocial
Disintegration and Survival (Lewiston, 1986); G. Spraul, 'Der "Völkermord" an den
Herero: Untersuchungen zu einer neuen Kontinuitätsthese' in Geschichte in
Wissenschaft und Unterricht (1988/12), 713-39; and G. Sudholt, Die deutsche
Eingeborenenpolitik in Südwestafrika. Von den Anfängen bis 1904 (Hildesheim, 1975).
15
 Pool, Samuel Maharero, 272-74.
16
 L. von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika:
1894-1910, (Windhoek, 1979), 117. JBG's translation.
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had been punished enough. I suggested this to General von Trotha but he wanted
their total extermination.17
In early 1905 the German parliament rescinded Von Trotha's extermination
order following which captured Herero were placed in concentration camps
(Konzentrationslager) and put to work as forced labourers. By late 1905, an
estimated 8,800 Herero were confmed in camps and forced to work on various
military and civilian projects across GSWA.18 Missionary sources provide first-
hand eyewitness accounts of conditions in the camps. In Karibib missionary
Elger wrote:
And then the scattered Herero retumed from the Sandfeld. Everywhere they popped
up -not in their original areas-, to submit themselves as prisoners. What did the
wretched people look like?! Some of them had been starved to skeletons with
hollow eyes, powerless and hopeless, afflicted by serious diseases, particularly with
dysentery. In the settlements they were placed in big kraals, and there they lay,
without blankets and some without clothing, in the tropical rain on the marshlike
ground. Here death reaped a harvest! Those who had some semblance of energy
naturally had to work. (...)
It was a terrible misery with the people; they died in droves. Once 24 came together,
some of them carried. In the next hour one died, in the evening the second, in the
first week a total of ten - all to dysentery - the people had lost all their energy and
all their will to live. (...)
Hardly cheering cases were those where people were handed in to be healed from
the effects of extreme mistreatment (schwerer Misshandlungen): there were bad
cases amongst these.19
The Herero camps were finally abolished in 1908, atter which the Herero
were confmed within a tangled web of legislation that sought to control the
lives, in their entirety, of all black people living in German South West Africa.
Within the areas of German control, all Africans over the age of eight were
"Ibid. 116-17. JBG's translation.
18
 Berichte Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft (BRMG) 1906, 10.
"ELCRN, V. 12, Missions Chromeken, Karibib 1906, written by missionary Elger. See
also BRMG 1906, 11-12. That this mistreatment of Herero was not merely incidental but
structural is indicated by a circular letter from military headquarters in Windhoek to the
German officer commanding Karibib in late 1906. The letter noted '(...) due to the
mishandling of Herero prisoners, who act as carriers, it is advisable to recruit Ovambo
labour as carriers'. NNAW, STR 19 l.und 4. Kompagnie Karibib, Letter Windhuk
16/11/06.
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ordered to wear metal passes. They were embossed with the imperial crown,
magisterial district and labour number, and were used to facilitate German
control of labour. In addition, all Herero were prohibited from owning land and
cattle - the two basic necessities of a society based on pastoralism.
'Blue Book'(1914-1921)
At the outbreak of the First World War, South African forces under British
command invaded German South West Africa and defeated the much-vaunted
German army. Between 1915 and 1921, Namibia feil under the jurisdiction of a
military administration. As the war progressed, it became clear that the
victorious parties had no intention of allowing Germany to retain its colonies.
To this end, from at least 1915 onwards, British colonial officials were
instructed to gather material which would strengthen the British Empire's
claims to Germany's colonies.20 In Namibia this task was facilitated by the
existence of a well-organized and detailed German government archive which
the incoming military administration found waiting for it in Windhoek. In the
most chilling detail, officials found in it accounts and reports on the manner in
which the settlers of German South West Africa and its administration had dealt
with the country's original inhabitants. Apart from files dealing with the way in
which the Herero had been incarcerated in concentration camps and distributed
amongst settlers and companies, the archives also contained a series of
documents dealing with the excesses of settlers who had flogged Herero. Glass-
plate negatives detailed the torn and rotting backs of women flogged for alleged
insubordination, and pages and pages of court transcripts covering the brutal
lashings of labourers.21
Apart from detailed archives, the South Africans were greeted by a
population more than willing to provide information about their experiences
under German rule. During the course of their successful military campaign,
South African forces were dependent on Herero scouts for information
regarding watering points, routes and so forth. These scouts had in many cases
fought against German forces between 1904 and 1908 and had vivid memories
of the atrocities committed by German soldiers at that time. Often these scouts
20
 Public Records Office (PRO) CO 537/1-17 Telegram from Mr Long, to Australia,
New Zealand and South Africa, 4 January 1918 quoted in 'Memo for War Cabinet', 15
October 1918.
21
 The glass-plate negatives and files, and in fact most of the original source material
used to compile the Blue Book have been sought out by J. Silvester and J.B. Gewald in
the National Archives of Namibia. Silvester and Gewald are currently engaged in
republishing an edited and annotated edition of the Blue Book.
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were the sons of Herero chiefs who prior to and in the course of German
colonialism had turned in vain to Britain for assistance. They were highly
articulate men who left a deep impression on the South African officers they
were assigned to. Being Herero royals, these men also had direct access to
substantial numbers of people. When in 1917 the military administration
formally called upon its magistrates to provide information that would
substantiate the British Empire's claims to the territory, men such as magistrate
O'Reilly of Omaruru could depend on the support of the Herero commumty. A
memorandum for the war cabinet noted:
The rullest reply received has been from the Union which sent a series of statements
on oath by responsible and respected leaders of the various native races of South-
West Africa.22
The combination of testimony taken from the German archives found in
Windhoek along with a series of painstakingly detailed statements taken under
oath from large numbers of surviving Namibians resulted in the pubhcation of
one of the most shocking documents of colonial history. The Report on the
Natives of South-West Africa and their Treatment by Germany (London 1918),
generally referred to as the 'Blue Book', remains an indispensable source
document on the nature of German colonial rule in Namibia. It is bevond doubt
that the events and issues presented so clearly in it served to scuttle any attempts
by Germany to retain control over its former colonies, and Namibia m
particular.23 In the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was deemed to be unfit to
govern colonies and forced to renounce 'in favour of the Principal AlliaUnd
Associated Powers, all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions - In
addition, in terms of the Charter of the League of Nations, Namibia, which was
seen to be 'inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the
strenuous conditions of the modern world", was deemed to be a territory which
could 'be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory [the Union of
22
 PRO CO 537/1-17 Memo for War Cabinet, 15 October 1918.
* A J Mayer Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and
Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967) provides a detaüed and
autoritative account of the Versailles Treaty negotiations. Carneg.e Endowment for
l±adonal Peace, The Treaües of Peace 1919-1923 (New York, 1924) contams a
complete text of the 1919 treaty.
24
 Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles.
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South Africa] as integral portions of its territory'.25 As such, Namibia was
placed under the jurisdiction of South Africa.26
The Blue Book was not unique. The British also commissioned research into
the Armenian genocide perpetrated in 1915 by the forces of the Ottoman
Empire, Germany's First World War allies. In the aftermath of the humiliation
of Versailles and in direct response to the Blue Book, the Germans published a
'White Book' on the activities of Britain in its colonies. Nevertheless, the Blue
Book had fulfilled the purposes for which it had originally been compiled, and
the genocide perpetrated by imperial Germany on the Herero had been
successfully used for political purposes. Germany was forced to relinquish
forever its colonies.27
White settler unity and the Blue Book (1920-1928)
Within settler society in Namibia under South African mandate, the existence of
the Blue Book continued to bedevil settler politics. German settlers wanted to
have the Blue Book banned and all copies of the publication destroyed. In 1925
the first all-white election for a legislative assembly took place. Representatives
of the German settler party, the Deutsche Bund in Südwestafrika, opposed
settler parties allied to the Union of South Africa. Anxious to maintain a
working relationship within the legislative assembly, the administrator, AJ.
Werth, acceded to German settler demands for the abolition of the Blue Book.
Thus in 1926, Mr Stauch, a member of the all-white legislative assembly in
Namibia, tabled a motion stating that the Blue Book:
...only has the meaning of a war-instrument and that the time has come to put this
instrument out of Operation and to impound and destroy all copies of this Bluebook,
which may be found in the official records and in public libraries of this Territory.28
23
 Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations.
26
 A. du Pisani, SouthWest Africa/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change
(Windhoek, 1985), 76.
27
 This must have been galling given that there was a secret convention in 1898 which
contemplated the partition between Great Britain and Germany of certain of Portugal's
African colonies in the event of it not being found possible to maintain the integrity of
the African possessions of Portugal. PRO CO 323/957/5 'Draft Memo: The Case for
Mandate', Under-Secretary of State for the Colonial Office, 30 June 1926.
28
 NNAW, ADM 225, Memorandum on the Blue Book, Annex A. In addition, the
administration was 'requested to make representations to the Union Government and to
the British Government to have this Bluebook expunged from the official records of
those Governments'. Furthermore Stauch's motion requested that the administration
'take into consideration the advisability of making representations to the Union
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The motion was passed and legislation came to into force, to be apphed m all
territories administered by the Union of South Africa that circumscnbed the
distribution of the Blue Book. Copies were no longer made avaüable to the
public and were removed from libraries and destroyed. In the rest of the British
Empire copies of the Blue Book were moved to the Foreign Office. Even m
wartime Britain as late as 1941, in response to a request from the Mmistry of
Information, it was noted that: 'No copy may be issued without authonty of the
librarian'.29 . , , . , .,
Stauch and his fellow members of the Deutsche Bund consciously demed the
recorded role of German settlers and soldiers in the Herero genocide and put
pressure on the South African administration to accede to their demands. As
Stauch noted, the passing of the motion 'would...remove one of the most
serious obstacles to mutual trust and co-operation in this country [Namibia] . In
his view 'the honour of Germany had been attacked in the most public manner
and it was right that the attack should be repudiated in an equally pubhc
fashion ( ) The defence of the honour of one's country was a solemn duty
imposed upon all sons ofthat country.' The validity of Stauch's claims were not
questioned by the assembly, even less was any Herero view of the recorded
events given an airing. The subjective arguments of Stauch and lus compatnots
sought to obscure a historical past in the interests of their own continued
privileged position as settlers. The promise of peaceful cooperation with the
German settler commumty was uppermost in the minds and concerns of South
Africa's administrators. Stauch claimed that 'the Germans were ready and
anxious to co-operate in the building up of South West but they could not do so
fully until the stigma imposed by the publication of the Bluebook ...had been
removed from their name'. This claim was considered to be more important
than historical veracity and the views of Namibia's African inhabitants. In other
words, the Herero who died in the genocide were dismissed and forgotten m the
interests of white settler cooperation.
Michael Scott and Herero representations to the UN (1945-1952)
To the members of the white settler community it may have looked as if their
attempts to rewrite their own vision of the past had succeeded. For a number of
years after 1926 nothing was heard of the Herero genocide. Within the territory,
Government and the British Government to impound and destroy all copies of the
Bluebook, which may be found in the public libraries in the respective Countnes and
with the official booksellers mentioned on the title-sheet of the Bluebook .
29
 PRO F= 371/26574 Minute, 20 June 1941.
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Herero had withdrawn to the newly established native reserves and refrained
from directly articulating demands that related to the genocide.30 This is not to
say that the genocide was no longer of any importance to Herero society, far
from it. Instead, Herero society literally turned in upon itself and sought as
much as possible to refrain from any form of interaction with the colonial state.
References to the genocide perpetrated upon the Herero surfaced from time to
time in unexpected places, yet it was no longer an essential part of the colonial
discourse.31
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the South African government
undertook steps to incorporate Namibia as the fifth province in the Union of
South Africa. To this end, in 1946, a series of staged meetings was held with the
African population of the territory. As the newly formed United Nations had
taken over from the League of Nations, Namibia, as a mandated territory, feil
under the jurisdiction of South Africa under the auspices of the United Nations.
With carefully structured meetings, it was hoped that the colonially appointed
and recognized leaders of Namibia's African populations would sanction South
Africa's plan to incorporate Namibia. However, this was not to be. The events
of 1904-1908 once again became part and parcel of settler and administrative
concerns with the arrival of Rev. Michael Scott in Windhoek in 1947.32 In
conjunction with Herero leaders, Scott used the atrocities perpetrated in the
Herero genocide as a weapon at the United Nations against the incorporation of
30
 J.B. Gewald, 'We Thought We Would Be Free': Socio-Cultural Aspects of Herero
History in Namibia 1915-1940 (Cologne, 2001).
31
 Thus while searching for waterholes in the newly established Herero reserves in the
eastern reaches of South West Africa, British administrators stumbled across the site of
the German massacre of Herero at Ombakaha. Gewald, Herero Heroes, 182.
32
 Scott is one of the more remarkable figures of Southern African history. Having
experienced Ghandi in India, Scott became actively involved in the anti-colonial
struggle, first in India and later in Southern Africa. Initially Scott campaigned amongst
the Indian Community in Natal, and later became active in drawing attention to and
improving the shameful living conditions in Bethel, one of Johannesburg's 'native
locations'. In exile hè founded the Africa Bureau in London and continued campaigning
for Namibia's independence, even going so far as to drop his initial non-violent
approach. In 1958, whilst attending the All African People's Conference in Accra, Scott
delivered a speech to the delegates on behalf of the Herero people living in Namibia
who had been prevented from sending their own representatives. In his speech, Scott
called for the creation of an African freedom army saying, 'Africa needs such a freedom
army desperately urgently if it is to be saved from inhumanity'. Scott continues to be
fondly remembered by many in Namibia. His activities brought the injustices of
colonial rule in Namibia to the attention of the wider world. For an overview of this
remarkable man's life see F. Troup, In Face of Fear: Michael Scott's Challenge to
South Africa (London, 1950).
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Namibia into South Africa. In the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, the füll
extent of which was still only just beginning to be understood, genocide
committed by an earlier generation of Germans made powerful political
ammunition.
Throughout most of 1948, Michael Scott lived in a tent along the Gammans
River just beyond the Windhoek old location. Here hè met and entertained
township residents, many of whom had experienced the horrors of German rule
at first hand.33 Scott's attention was drawn to the Herero genocide. Here, in a
nutshell, Scott realized the sum of the inequities of colonial rule: a people
driven off their land, slaughtered, banished to live in barren homelands, and still
with no rights. An article entitled 'Michael Scott and the Hereros' published in
The New Statesman and Nation in 1949 presented Scott's summary of
Namibian history:
Then came the German colonists, hungry for land; and finally von Trotha, a general
whom Hitler would have delighted to honour. (...) In 1904 hè issued the
'Extermination Order'. All Hereros whether man, woman or child were to be killed.
An orgy of looting, torture, and massacre followed. To read the records is exactly
like reading the accounts of the obliteration of Poland, except that the Germans had
not gas chambers then, but killed babies with their own hands, or burned sick old
women in their huts. The tribe broke and fled... The majority, all but flfteen
thousand out of ninety thousand, were hacked to pieces by the Germans or died of
thirst.34
The mention of Von Trotha's 'Extermination Order' clearly indicates that
Scott must have gained access to a copy of the Blue Book. Scott's history also
made explicit the link between the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis and the
activities of the forces of Imperial Germany in Namibia, a link that continues to
garner extensive academie interest.35 In addition, Scott indicated how the South
Africans had betrayed the Herero:
33
 Troup, Face of Fear, 173-80.
34
 NNAW, SWAA 1981, A 427/48, Rev. M. Scott, Typed copy of article that appeared
in The New Statesman and Nation, 5 March 1949.
35
 Hannah Arendt became the first academie to alert the world to the linkages that exist
between Germany's colonial past and the later development of the national socialist
state. H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1967). The work of East and
West German historians, Horst Drechsler and Helmut Bley further developed this
theme, and recently a new generation of historians has once again taken it up. A
selection of some of the papers presented at the annual meeting of the African Studies
Association in Houston, Texas in November 2001 clearly brings this trend to the fore.
J.B. Gewald, 'Anticipating the Kaiser: German Soldiers and the Herero-German War';
J. Gaydish, '"Die Lösung der Eingeborenenfrage": The Role of the Swakopmund
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In the 1914 war, lured by British promises that native lands would be returned, the
desert remnant trekked back. But in 1918 they met not the British as the Mandatory
Power, but the South Africans, who never for a moment considered giving them
back their tribal lands. Some pastures were left to the German settlers who
remained. More went to the Afrikaner settlers, ...36
Throughout 1948 and 1949 and in the face of constant harassment, Scott
sought to bring conditions as they existed in Namibia to world attention.
Eventually in November 1949 the United Nations granted Scott an official
hearing. In the months following this hearing, the colonial authorities in
Namibia starled a campaign to dismiss his statements.37 Vilified in the press,
Scott continued to be supported by Herero, many of whom recalled the events
of 1904-1908 to justify and support their faith in Scott. One such Herero, who
signed his letter as 'A Native who had been deprived of his land from 1904-
1950', noted:
I want to emphasise that the information given by the Rev. Michael Scott at UNO is
what actually happened in S.W.A. and was obtained from the best reliable sources.38
Finally in 1950, Scott, already the victim of constant harassment, was
declared a prohibited immigrant and prevented from ever returning to Namibia.
The Herero genocide and nationalist struggle (1958-1990)
In Namibia, the events of 1904-1908 informed the establishment of the South
West African National Union (SWANU) and the South West African People's
Organization (SWAPO). Particularly within SWANU, which came to be
dominated by Herero ideologues, the loss of the land incurred in the Herero
genocide proved to be a major mobilizing factor.39 Within Namibia, the political
Concentration Camp in the Development of German "Native Policy" in Southwest
Africa'; C. Erischsen, 'Shark Island: Forgotten Concentration Camps and History in
Colonial Namibia 1904-1908'.
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mobilization, which had begun in earnest in the years after the Second World
War, was brutally terminated by the December shootings of 1959. These
shootings, by the South African authorities, took place in response to African
protests against the Apartheid Group Areas Act.40 In the aftermath of the
shootings, there was a substantial South African government clamp-down on
nationalist political organization in Namibia. This saw the flight into exile of
many of Namibia's most highly skilled and articulate Herero.41 It was in the
context of these events that some of the Herero leaders who had remained
within the territory sought to play down the ideas of conflict and tension
engendered through the remembrance and commemoration of the Herero
genocide. Instead they sought to pursue a policy of appeasement in which they
urged leaders of the German community to do the same. The conditions of
heightened repression and tension that existed in Namibia at the time made
some of the Herero leaders within the territory seek cooperation as opposed to
Opposition to the settler community. As Herero chief Hosea Kutako stated in
response to German commemorations of the Battle of Hamakari:
We do not want to cling to the past or to have old war grudges. Our aim is to forget
the past and to look forward rather than backward and to have good relations with
all sections of the population but good relations cannot exist if some people try to
remind us of the bad past.42
Younger Herero such as Clemens Kapuuo, Hosea Kutako's eventual successor,
were far less conciliatory. When German settlers wanted to commemorate the
Herero-German War, Kapuuo reminded them of the terror wrought in the genocide
and its links to the Holocaust.
To our minds there is little difference between the extermination order of General
von Trotha and the extermination of Jews by Adolf Hitler. The members of the Alte
Kameraden are today a free people whereas the Hereros are not and are under a
foreign Government which was elected partly by members of the Alte Kameraden. It
is natural that the Hereros would be opposed to the celebration of a battle which
placed them under foreign domination up to this day.43
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As might well have been expected, Carl Schrader, a spokesman for the Alte
Kameraden, denied that the Herero had been 'exterminated'.
In exile, the genocide perpetrated upon the Herero and the Nama came to be
one of the pillars of anti-colonial propaganda used by those who wanted to rid
Namibia of its South African occupiers. Initially, this propaganda was based
primarily on the works of Bley and Drechsler. Given the gravity of the Herero
genocide, it seems remarkable that the only published account of it in English
until the 1970s was the Blue Book. The reworked academie theses of the
German historians Horst Drechsler and Helmut Bley first appeared in German
in 1966 and 1968 in East and West Germany respectively. Bley's work came
out in English in 1971, whilst Drechsler's was only published in English in
1980.44 These two excellent studies were primarily concerned with a debate
relating to the nature of German imperialism and the development of totalitarian
societies. Both books sought and found the roots of National Socialism in
Germany's colonial past in Namibia. For both historians, the genocide
committed upon the inhabitants of Namibia between 1904 and 1908
foreshadowed later events in Western Europe between 1939 and 1945. As Bley
noted in the conclusion to his work:
In SWA conditions crossed over into totalitarianism. This confirms, perhaps even
reinforces, Hannah Arendt's contention that in African colonialism one may find the
seeds of modern totalitarian rule.45
The publication of To be Born a Nation by the SWAPO publiciry bureau in
London owed much to these two works.46 The title referred to SWAPO's
nationalist slogan 'To die a tribe, to be born a nation', which reflected the
earlier words of the Nama anti-colonial warrior Hendrik Witbooi who, while
fighting against the Germans, had called others to arms with the words:
Let us die fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some
other calamity.47
For the first time in a single volume, the atrocities committed by the
Germans were linked directly to the atrocities being committed by South
44
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African security forces operating in Namibia and Angola at the time.
Photographs of emaciated Herero with lashed backs were juxtaposed with
images of migrant workers and affluent whites. The genocide perpetrated upon
the Herero and Nama was conveniently linked to the exploitation of
predominantly Ovambo migrant labourers. This oppression and exploitation
were seen as two examples on a linked continuüm of illegal colonial rule.48 In
this manner, the Herero genocide became the shared history of oppression of all
Africans living in Namibia, and not just the Herero. The beaten backs of Herero
in 1908 came to be linked to the beaten and burnt faces of Koevoet prisoners in
northern Namibia in the 1980s.49
In the early 1980s, shortly after hè had completed his PhD in history at
Oxford University, Peter Katjavivi - the current Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Namibia - became the highly articulate SWAPO spokesman in
London. Well-versed in the history of Namibia, Katjavivi did not hesitate to
liken the attacks of South African forces to those perpetrated by Von Trotha 75
years earlier. The anti-colonial struggles of the Herero and the Nama came to be
applied to all of Namibia, as if the nationalist struggle had begun with the wars
undertaken by imperial Germany against the Nama and the Herero. The
published version of Katjavivi's thesis A History of Resistance in Namibia
clearly feil within this paradigm. It argued that Namibia's colonial governments
were a single continuüm where South African soldiers and police in the 1980s
were continuing the work starled by the German colonial Schutztruppe in the
1890s.50 To a lesser extent, the work of Kaire Mbuende, who like Katjavivi was
a Herero historian in exile, also emphasized the perceived continuüm.51
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South Africa and the Herero genocide (1970-1990)
Whilst SWAPO used the history of the genocide to fiirther its nationalist
struggle from exile, the South African authorities sought the collaboration of the
Herero and other communities inside Namibia through a selective
commemoration of historical events. As SWAPO had effectively appropriated
the sole rights, as it were, to use the genocide, those Herero who cooperated
with the South African government could not use it for political purposes even
though they were well aware of their history. In addition, they could not afford
to alienate a major influential constituency, namely that of the economically and
politically powerful German-speaking settler Community.
Members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) operating in Namibia
must have been aware of cross-currents in the minds of people in Namibia at the
time. The mass conscription of Herero into the South West African Territorial
Force (SWATF), the SADF proxy force in Namibia, united German settlers and
Herero in the same uniform for the first time since 1908. Indeed, the beret badge
of a section of the SWATF was that of a kudu, the symbol of the Herero royal
house of Tjamuaha. The SWATF officers' school was situated in Okahandja at
the ancestral site of the residences of the Tjamuaha chiefs. Herero and German
settler conscripts were expected to run up a hill at Osona and bring down leaves
from the tree at the top of mis hill. The fact that the hill was one on which
Herero chief Samuel Maharero anticipated the arrival of German soldiers in
1892, or that the tree in question was a Witgat boom that is considered by
Herero to bear ritual meaning, cannot have been missed by observers.52
From 1978 onwards the massed annual commemorative marches of Herero
para-militaries to the graves of Herero chiefs in Okahandja became an event that
was almost totally dominated by the SADF and SWATF. The commemorations
of Herero chiefs, and through them the Herero dead of the genocide, became a
demonstration of South African-sponsored Opposition to SWAPO. In what is
one of the profound ironies of Southern African history, SWATF forces,
consisting in large measure of Herero conscripts, marched in staged spectacles
in support of South Africa and against the liberation of their country. Indeed,
the fraternity of blood brotherhood, which had allegedly been created between
Herero and German settlers in the 1904-1908 genocide, now came to be realized
in the massed marches of Herero and German settler conscripts. In support of
this new-found fraternity, and in conscious negation of the past, Herero symbols
were used to forge an Opposition to nationalist forces. It was in this period that
52
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Namibian papers carried extensive coverage of Herero soldiers at the graves of
German soldiers at the annual commemorations in Okahandja.
In the second half of the 1980s, there was a flurry in which officially
sanctioned monuments, graveyards and game reserves were established. Under
the auspices of the SADF, ethnologists were asked to find and document the
graves and monuments of Namibia's African people. In so doing, ethnologists
travelled throughout the territory documenting graves and, in part, history. As a
result of these activities, state-funded monuments came 'to be erected to the
memory of Herero chiefs who had cooperated with the South African colonial
administration.
At the same time, the Waterberg and its immediate environs, the site of the
defeat of Herero forces in 1904, was declared a game reserve. In other words,
the Waterberg, the symbol and site of the Herero genocide, was consciously
robbed of its potent symbolic function by relegating it to the status of a tourist
resort.53 In the Namibian newspapers of the period, in particular those owned by
the South African-funded Republican press, there is no mention of the genocide.
In addition, the genocide is almost totally missing from historical work being
conducted in Namibia at the time. The Herero oral historian Alexander Kaputu,
who was employed by the South African-sponsored Namibian Broadcasting
Corporation, also steered clear of the subject. Afrikaner historian Gerhardus
Pool discussed the war but not the genocide, and settler historian Sudholt denied
that the genocide had taken place. This was a clear case of what Anderson
charmingly referred to as 'remembering to forget'.54
The successful Sublimation of the Herero genocide in the interests of a
unified front against the forces of nationalism drew the attention of SWAPO
military planners. SWAPO propaganda continually railed against those Herero
leaders who cooperated with the South Africans and referred to the history of
anti-colonial resistance of Herero chiefs such as Samuel Maharero. It is possible
that military operations were undertaken by SWAPO in eastern Hereroland
because SWAPO planners wanted Herero to 'remember to remember'.
Throughout the Bush War in Namibia, SWAPO military activities in eastern
Hereroland were doomed to failure, and SWAPO planners were well aware of
this. By the end of 1978, South African forces had effective and total military
53
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control of Namibia. In the event of attempted mfiltrations by SWAPO's
People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), South African 'hunter-killer'
units, such as Koevoet, ensured that mcursions were short-lived. Although
SWAPO planners knew that their forces would be defeated, captured and killed,
the symbolic action of an infiltration into eastern Hereroland would not have
been lost on the Herero population. The PLAN fighters who were infiltrated by
SWAPO into Hereroland were a carefiilly selected multi-ethnic group of young
Namibians, representative of the nation that was to be. Given that the military
validity for their incursion was non-existent, one could argue that this group of
young people was sacnfïced in the hope that their actions would trigger
memories of the Herero genocide, memories that would come to substantiate
support for SWAPO, as opposed to collaboration with the South Africans.55
Namibian independence, Herero genocide and Herero unity f 1990-
2000)
Whereas in the years leading up to independence in 1990 the Herero genocide
had been successfully appropriated by the nationalist forces allied to SWAPO,
immediately after Namibian independence the Herero genocide became the
preserve of Herero elites opposed to the new government. In the run-up to
independence, Herero activists began seeking a formal apology from the
German government for the events of 1904-1908. In the late 1980s, SWANU
activists living in Germany had already approached the anti-Apartheid
movement in the Netherlands for assistance m bringing a case against the West
German government.56
After independence, the SWAPO government of Namibia tried to ensure that
Herero claims for reparation would remain muted or couched within the
demands of the nation-state which they controlled. The last time that
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government ministers referred directly to the issue was during the visit of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bundes-President Herzog to Namibia in 1995. At
the time, Foreign Affairs Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab noted in an interview that
the injustices committed against the Namibian people by the former German
colonial power would always remain a 'festering sore' and the two countries
needed to discuss war reparations 'at some stage'. Yet he also said that the issue
was at that time not a priority for the government, though hè did add that 'we
must have the courage and frankness to discuss this when the time is right'.57 In
2002, the government, reaping the rewards of a booming tourist industry, was
well aware of the benefits that accrue to the state on account of continued close
economie and military cooperation with Germany.58
During their 1995 visit, Chancellor Kohl and President Herzog refused to
meet Herero representatives and found themselves unable to offer an apology to
the people of Namibia for what had happened in the past. Instead, Herzog
referred to the war as 'a dark chapter in our bilateral relations' and made the
extravagant claim that the massacres formed 'a bürden on the conscience of
every German'.59 Up to 2002, the government of Schroeder and Rau has also
made no official statement with regard to Herero claims. This is in contrast to
when the former governing parties were still in Opposition and they agreed that
what had occurred in Namibia constituted genocide.60
The current government of Namibia is dominated by people who know that
their support base is largely to be found in the Ovambo north.61 This area,
though deeply affected by war during the dying days of South African
occupation, was left untouched by German imperialism. Although Herero and
Nama lost all their lands, the inhabitants of the Ovambo kingdoms were never
driven off their lands by either the German or South African colonial presence.
As such, the present government does not feel itself called upon to fight for
something that is not part and parcel of its shared historical experience. In
addition, the government is at pains to ensure that its heroes, and not those of
another sector of society, receive recognition. This was well illustrated by the
spectacle of the statue of the Herero chief Hosea Kutako that was placed in front
57
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of the Namibian parliament in early 1999 and immediately covered with black
plastic sacking. Kutako, a major nationalist leader, also happened to be Herero,
and though the government did not state so outright, Kutako's ethnic
background ensured that his statue remained clad for no less than two years.
The statue was eventually unveiled on 10 December 2001, Namibia's Human
Rights Day. However, Kutako's statue was not unveiled alone. Instead it was
unveiled together with two others hastily commissioned after the original statue
of Hosea Kutako had been erected in early 1999. The two other starues were
those of Reverend Theophelus Hamutumbangela and Captain Hendrik Samuel
Witbooi, two nationalist leaders who had done much to ensure the
establishment and maintenance of the ruling SWAPO party.62 The disrespect
shown to Kutako, a man who came through the genocide and sought to re-
establish Herero society and later fought for Namibian independence, merely
serves to ensure that Herero speakers who entered post-colonial society in a
thoroughly divided condition now find a shared identity in the genocide
experienced by their ancestors and not by the ancestors of the current
government.
It is in this context that, on 22 August 1999, Dr Kuaima Riaruako, the self-
appointed paramount chief and king of all of the Herero, proclaimed that the
'Herero nation' as a whole had decided to approach the International Court of
Justice in The Hague, where a charge of genocide was to be laid against the
German state and war reparations would be demanded for genocide committed
in Namibia against the Herero between 1904 and 1907. At the time, Riaruako's
statement caused a few ruffled feathers in Namibia. German diplomats in
Windhoek emailed colleagues in Bonn and Berlin to look into the issue, and
then two days later a clinically worded statement by a spokesperson of the
International Court in The Hague put everyone, with the exception of Riaruako,
at ease.
Only states may be parties in contentieus cases before the ICJ and hence submit
cases to it against other States.61
However, nobody had actually approached the International Court of Justice,
and clearly no case was being seriously constructed against the German
government to plead for war reparations in Namibia. Why then did Riaruako go
out of his way to claim that this was so? A possible explanation is that, since
Herero identity increasingly appears to be determined by a shared history of
genocide, Riaruako can claim to speak on behalf of his people as long as hè is
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able to control the calls for reparation.64 If the Namibian government fails to
take the initiative and call for reparation on behalf of the Herero and Nama,
Riaruako can continue to control these financial demands, secure in the
knowledge that hè enjoys the support of the majority of Herero speakers.
In the absence of a formal apology, the call for war reparations from
Germany has become more vociferous. Government inaction and the continued
extensive presence of German tourists, settlers, businesses and farms merely
serve to legitimate and emphasize the demands on the part of the Herero and
strengthen the bonds of a shared genocidal experience. Recently, this has been
emphasized with the launch of two court cases in the District Court of Columbia
in the United States. With the assistance of Afro-American organizations, the
Herero People's Reparations Corporation was established, with the objective of
suing three German companies, Deutsche Bank AG, Terex Corporation
(Orenstein und Koppel) and Woermann Linie (Deutsch Afrika Linien), as well
as the Federal Republic of Germany in the person of its foreign minister,
Joschka Fischer, for reparations. The introductory paragraph of the charge reads
as follows:
...the Federal Republic of Germany ('Defendant' or 'Germany'), in a brutal alliance
with German multi-national corporations, relentlessly pursued the enslavement and
the genocidal destruction of the Herero Tribe in Southwest Arrica, now Namibia.
Foreshadowing with chilling precision the irredeemable horror of the European
Holocaust only decades later, the Defendant formed a German commercial
enterprise which cold-bloodedly employed explicitly-sanctioned extermination, the
destruction of tribal culture and social organization, concentration camps, forced
labor, medical experimentation and the exploitation of women and children in order
to advance their common financial interests.65
Possibly the historical linkage between the Herero genocide and the later
Holocaust was emphasized because of the notable success that Holocaust
claimants have had in the American courts.
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While in the past it was the Otruppe or Tmppenspieler66 that maintained
Herero identity in the face of colonial repression, now it is participation in
discussion about genocide that performs that role. Association with the dreadful
events of 1904-1908, even if only through language or fourth-generation
descendancy, allows for the participation of all in the world of war reparations.
This has also come to be combined with a notion of remembering-to-forget the
often enormous differences that existed and still exist between the Herero.67
Historically, Herero speakers were divided amongst themselves. Not all sections
of Herero society were equally affected by the genocide, let alone in the South
African Apartheid years. Yet discourse on the genocide allows people to paper
over these distinctions. It is thus the first truly shared experience of all Herero
speakers in the present.68
Genocide, memory and resistance
In Namibia, memories of the genocide perpetrated between 1904 and 1908 have
been instrumentalized and were used to further the aims and objectives of
differing socio-political actors during the course of the twentieth Century.
Herero have sought to use the memory of their seminal act of resistance, which
was in effect a disastrous failure, to advance and substantiate further acts of
resistance since 1904, and memories of the genocide have been redeployed over
the years in differing circumstances and with varying goals. Yet underlying all
of these deployments has been the intention of Herero political actors to further
their position and resist colonial and current post-colonial domination.
The immensity of the catastrophe that befell the peoples of central Namibia
between 1904 and 1908 was such that it could not, and still cannot, be banished
from public memory and debate. However, in Namibia prior to the Second
World War, though the enormity of the genocide was known, it was not
necessarily appreciated and expressed by all. For the Herero, it was an event in
history that knows no comparable precedent. Yet though both Herero survivors
and German perpetrators were aware of what had happened in Namibia between
66
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1904 and 1908, German settlers were able to dismiss the Herero genocide as
nothing more than a colonial war. However, the füll horror of the Herero
genocide became apparent to observers when, in the aftermath of the Second
World War, the Nazi Holocaust became known to the wider world. The real and
imagined linkages of the Herero genocide to the Nazi Holocaust could not be
hidden and came to be deployed in further discussions relating to the Herero
genocide. Hence, the Nazi holocaust changed forever the import and meaning of
the Herero genocide.
Engaged as the Herero are at present in a legal tussle for war reparations,
Herero political actors are well aware of the Nazi Holocaust and are making füll
use of the implications of this fact. In this manner the Herero indicate how
memories, even of failed acts of past resistance, can be used as acts of resistance
in the present. Though resistance to colonial rule in Namibia was by and large
unarmed, it was not passive. Instead, it was a struggle for control of memory
that mformed and guided Herero political actors in their dealings with the
colonial and post-colonial state. From 1945 onwards it came to be seen in the
wider context of the Nazi Holocaust, and the issue of morality began to be
emphasized. In Namibia the party that speaks on behalf of those killed in the
Herero genocide can now claim the moral high-ground.
Thus, the case of the Herero genocide in Namibia emphasizes once more that
though physical resistance may be of a passing nature, memories may continue
to inform and justify political action long after the events that spawned them
have receded into the past.
12
'Namibia, land of the brave': Selective
memories on war and violence within nation
building*
Henning Melber
The limits to the memory of liberation are investigated with
regard to the factors affecting a liberation movement in the
process of achieving legitimate power m a post-colonial
society. The case of Namibia is explored in the transition
from anti-colonial resistance to comprehensive control, by
the farmer liberation movement, over the state. The concepts
of political rule, the state and democracy are tested against
the impact of a liberation struggle in terms of the apphed
understanding of political dommance once access to power
has been achieved. The political culture under a government
with a record of liberation struggle suggests limitations to
the Implementation of democracy.
Namibia, land of the brave,
freedomfight we have won,
glory to the bravery,
whose blood watered ourfreedom.
These are the first four lines of Namibia's national anthem. lts melody was
composed and selected during a competition before independence in early 1990
and the words were added a few months later.' The anthem is evidence of the
* I am grateful to Reinhart Koessier for his comments on the draft manuscript of this
chapter.
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 These introductory lines led to some raised eyebrows and concerns among members of
the white minority with regard to the extent to which the declared notion of national
